The Miracle of Atheism

Laurence W. Wood

Contemporary forms of atheism among analytic philosophers are rooted
largely in the skeptical writings of David Hume and his empiricism.
During the Scottish Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, Hume recom
mended that any claims to knowledge a out the world, God and the self
which

flames

were

not

ased

This attack

foundation for the

on

on
sensory e perience should e committed to the
traditional metaphysics was intended to destroy the

proofs for God s e istence.
empiricism formed the asis for the rise of a new philosophy
known first as logical positivism and later called logical empiricism. It first
emerged during the years following World War I from a group of e -scien
tists turned philosophers who were located in ienna, Austria. The influ
ence of these e -scientists
philosophers uickly spread throughout Britain
and America, primarily through the writings of A. . Ayer and Rudolf
Carnap.
Their methods limited the scope of philosophy to logical analysis. More
specifically, philosophy was defined strictly as the logic of science. Only
empirical statements supported y the scientific method could form the
asis for meaningful, factual statements. This meant the re ection of tradi
tional theism in particular ecause it could not e confirmed or disconfirmed y appealing directly to sensory e perience. Ayer called this sensory
test of truth the verification
principle.
Hume s
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It is now well known that
logical en piricism self-destructed. or it ecame
o vious that the verification
principle itself was self-contradictory ecause it
could neither e confirmed nor disconfirmed as a
theory it was not su ect to

e perience. To e sure, the logical empiricists recogni ed this difficulty
y inconsistently allowing for an e ception to their own premise. It also
destroyed the asis for ethical theory, reducing all moral udgements to mere
sentiment. The logical empiricist s claim that all ethics is a matter of mere emo
tion is an a solute ethical udgment itself and can for that very reason e dis
missed as mere emotion according to its own principle.
These two difficulties in themselves were enough to make the logical empiri
cist s criterion of truth pro lematic, ut the fatal flaw to logical empiricism was
e posed when it was reali ed that oth science and history were also under
mined, since oth disciplines made statements a out things which could not e
directly e perienced. After all, the mission of logical empiricism was to free the
world of pretentious metaphysics, superstition, and religious eliefs. Its simulta
neous and unintended destruction of scientific and historical
knowledge was too
much. Australian philosopher John Passmore notes: Throw metaphysics into
sensory

the fire, and science goes with it, preserve science from the flames and meta
physics comes creeping ack.

Empiricist J. L. Mackie re ected logical positivism ecause, this theory of
meaning is itself highly implausi le. It is well known that the adoption of it
would similarly create serious difficulties for the meaning of many ordinary
statements, including all those a out past, historical events, or a out the minds,
thoughts and feelings of persons other than oneself.
Though philosophically logical empiricism self-destructed, it continues in a
modified form today among many Anglo-American philosophers as a asis for
refuting traditional theism. The atheism of I. L. Mackie is typical. He was a read
er in Philosophy at O ford University and fellow of University College, O ford,
prior to his death in 9 . Our purpose here will e to e amine some of the criti
cal points raised against traditional theism. Special attention will e given to
Mackie. A careful consideration of his atheistic perspective is deserving for at
least three

reasons.

y many as representative of the most persua
Anglo-American philosophy. Toward the end of
life, Mackie developed his most complete statement on religious atheism in
ook. The Miracle of Theism, which was pu lished posthumously. Kai Nielsen,
irst, J. L. Mackie is considered

sive form of atheism found in

his
his

who is also
is

one

point

of view

century, says that this ook
the most, distinguished articulation of an atheistic
in the twentieth century.

of the most articulate atheists in this

one of the most,

given

pro a ly

Second, his thinking is mainly rooted in the arguments of David Hume, who is the
patron saint of most contemporary Anglo-American atheists. We will thus engage the

thinking of

oth Hume and Mackie in assessuig the evidence for ehef in God.
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Third, Mackie e tends the thinking of the skeptical David Hume into

lown atheism. David Hume nowhere
his attack

largely

directly

em raced atheism. The

a

full

runt of

upon the dogmatic proofs for God s e istence widely
assumed in the deistic thinking of his time. He also attacked the foundation of
Christian faith in miracles. Hume at least allowed for the possi le e istence of
was

ased upon the design argument, and he was outraged with the dogmatic
atheism of the rench materialists. Mackie transforms the skepticism of Hume
into a dogmatic form of atheism. Whereas Hume said that the claims for

God

Christian faith cannot

e

reasona ly supported in matters of fact, Mackie says
supported. Whereas Hume said
sense
that no right-thinking per

any concept of God cannot e reasona ly
Christian faith is a miracle in the pe orative
son

should

e a le to em race it

ecause of insufficient evidence, Mackie

e tends this argument to include any claim for elief in God. Hence the title of
Mackie s ook. The Miracle of Theism. I shall argue, in contrast, that atheism is a
miracle in Hume s sense of eing irrational ecause the evidence for elief in
God is there for anyone who wills to know it.
One further comment a out the importance of
of atheism. Michael Novak o serves that the

considering Mackie s defense
ma ority of intellectual people,

especially scientists, artists, and professors in the United States, are atheists.
are
morally o ligated to consider and understand the reasons
why thoughtful people em race atheism if they are to engage in meaningful dia
logue with current thinking.
Christian theists

IS GOD-TALK INTELLIGIBLE

Unlike

some

contemporary atheists,

Mackie affirms the

intelligi ility

of the

traditional concept of God as a personal eing who is transcendent, creator of
all things, free to act with intention, omnipotent omniscient, perfect in goodness
and

worthy

of

worship.

He thinks that the

contemporary theistic philosopher,

Richard Swin urne, has shown that the logic of traditional religious language is
une uivocal, unam iguous and perfectly clear. Nonetheless, Mackie rightly

convincing evidence.
not God really e ists is
of
the
not determined simply
the
religious language. Of
logic
y
course, if religious language is incoherent then it hardly could e affirmed that
God actually e ists. But the coherence of theistic language and the actuahty of
God s e istence are logically distinct uestions.
Mackie understanda ly e cludes any discussion of non-traditional theists.
This neglect is not appreciated especially y process theologians. Daniel Day
Williams complains that philosophical critics of theism snu process theology.
He writes: The entire discussion a out rehgious language has gone on as if the
only conception of God which can e offered is that of traditional Christian the
ism especially in the form it takes in Anglican orthodo y.
points

out that

logical

coherence is not in itself

Swin urne likewise affirms the

point.
uestion of

same

Whether

or
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Mackie clearly e plains the reason for this omission in his reference to
process
theologian, Paul Tillich. If the concept of God e cludes the notion of personality
and

not

self-consciousness,

only indisputa le

most

a out, then

not

then such talk a out God is
ut uninteresting. If God is

even

so watered down

as

to

e

simply whatever you care
St. Anselm s fool will deny that God e ists. But so

easy a victory is not worth winning.
idea of self-consciousness is it worth

Only if
de ating.

a

definition of God includes the

IS GOD-TALK SENSIBLE

Granted that the main affirmations of theism
that

only arguments

traditional theism.

are

coherent, Mackie

eheved

rooted in sensory e perience will decide the truthfulness of
He re ected the earlier logical positivism and em raced a

weak verificationist view, that all our terms have to e given meaning y their
is some statements that are verifia le or confirma le in our e perience.

use

This weakened form of

logical empiricism still assumes that all knowledge is
ordinary sensory e perience. or e ample, even if we cannot verify the
statement, It was raining an hour ago, Mackie says we still can accept it as a
meaningful statement since it is grounded in ordinary sensory e perience.
Mackie s weakened version of the verificationist theory of meaning still
e cludes the possi ility that God e ists unless God is known to us directly
through our sensory e perience. Unless one can physically see, hear, smell,
touch, or taste directly for oneself the evidence for the reality of God, then we
have no rational asis for elieving. This is why one contemporary atheisL Kai
Nielsen, frankly says only an anthropomorphic theism is rationally coherent,
while the developed concept of God in Judeo-Christian tradition is incoherent.
Why Because the God of Christian theology transcends the world and is not lit
erally another finite eing alongside other eings in the world. Because of this,
God cannot e literally sensed God is Spirit John 4:24 , not an o ect capa le of
eing put inside a scientific la oratory. Since he cannot thus e verified in our
sensory or sensi le e perience, not even a weak verificationist theory of mean
ing will allow that he could possi ly e ist. It is apparent that Mackie and
Nielsen is still shackled y the earlier logical empiricism which assumed that all
statements of fact must e verified through our own five senses. It is thus diffi
cult, if not unintelligi le, to take Mackie seriously when he concedes that tra
ditional religious language is coherent.
rooted in

It is understanda le that Mackie e cludes historical
ases for

elief

considering

revelations, tradition and

his Humean

empiricism. He
philosophical
gives
arguments for
God s e istence the ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral argu
ments. The focus of our attention, however, will not e upon his criti ue of these
arguments. As insightful and convincing as the philosophical theistic arguments
are, as numerous contemporary philosophers of religion have demonstrated
common

thus

certainties

as

considera le attention to the traditional
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iMascall, Hick, S sin ume, Kiing, Plantinga, Pannen erg , and despite Mackie s
evaluation of them, we will not focus upon them ecause
they are not

negative

the fundamental

reasons

weak verificationist

of

ehe ang

meaning

in the God of Christian faith. Besides, his
has already e cluded the success of these

efore he e amines them. His

argrunents

even

possi ility
has egun

of pro Jlg
or God is

makes the e tensive

five

for

theory

epistemic presupposition really
altogether unnecessary-. The
God has een eliminated even efore the argumentation
not a sensi le fact, i.e., not an o ser a le fact
through our

argumentation

in his treatise

senses.

Mackie s verificationist

weakened version of

theory desery es at least two other criticisms. irst, his
logical empiricism is self-refuting. Like the logical empiri

cists, he insists that factual

e perience. has

ever

Yet the

ing

This

sensed it

statements must

e

verifia le

or

confirma le in

our

theory

may e logically coherent as an a stract idea, ut vho
That is, you can t touch, feel, taste, hear or smell this theor

theor re uires

that any claim to truth must e sensed What is surpris
even consider this self-contradiction which often was

is that Mackie does not

logical empiricists.
philosopher, Bertrand Russell, also em raced Humean
He
this dilemma. He recogni ed that this theory of
acknowledged
empiricism.
asis for all claims to knowledge could not e rational
sensory- e perience as the
ly resolved, ut nonetheless said that it was a ustifia le h -pothesis since it vas
foundational to knowing Russell thus interpreted this sensory, inductive
approach to all kno ving as a logically independent principle vhich cannot e
derived from sensory e perience itself.- This is a fancy vay of sa -ing that since
every ody reUes on their own sense e periences and we all come up wdth essentiall - the same opinions, then it is okay to take it on faith that it is a true theory
In terms of scientific discovery and ordinary- kno-yvledge of physical things, we
do re uire sensory- e perience. But this is hardly ustification for restricting aU
possi le knowledge to what can e sensed. Even contemporary- philosophy of
science shows that natural science is as dependent on intuiti -e thinking as it is
erificationist theory is self-refuting and ought
upon empirical e perience. This
to e committed to the flames, as Hume unwittingly encouraged others to do
with traditional metaph -sics without reali ing that his udgment apphed to his
own theory- as well. Only if there is a
personal, infinite Reason -yvhich accounts
for the e istence of our finite reason is it philosophically ustifia le to trust our
sensory e periences. To depend upon finite reason is impHdtly to depend upon
a
larger, more universal, self-e istent Reason vhich is the reason why anything
e ists. The alternative is nihihsm, which oth Hume and Mackie re ect. Hence, if
ve
finally have to admit, as RusseU did, that a Humean theory- of knowledge is
ased on a con -iction which is not su ect to its o sti rational demands, then we
ine ata ly mo e ack to Hume s skepticism. Mackie re ected skepticism, ut to
adopt Hume s empiricism without his skepticism is sheer dogmatism.
made

against

the

The famous British
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A second issue which must

faith in God

e

roached

immediately

is this

uestion:

Does

depend upon
argumentation
upon God s self-revelation
This uestion will e addressed later on, ut for now it should e
acknowledged
that the traditional elief in the i lical God did not come a out
our

or

originally
through rational, philosophical reflection. If God e ists, his reality is determined
for us y his own initiative. Mackie assumes that human
rationality alone must
decide the issue of God s e istence. Christian
in
contrast, has devel
theology,
its
rational
of
God
s
e
istence
in
the
oped
understanding
light of his self-disclo
sure in
Paul
that
God
showed
himself
in
the fullness of time
history.
argues
Galatians 4:4
which
he
means
that
when
the
human
race had reached a
y
mature

point

when it could

God introduced himself

appreciate

and understand God s true nature, then
fully. Out of God s self-introduction.

personally
theology was then a le to construct a rational theological understand
ing through reflecting on the meaning of this divine disclosure. To take seriously
and

Christian

Christian

why

elief in God should

re uire

Christians

that

one

e amine in detail the main

rea

elieve in God, namely the history of revelation. Mackie s
almost e clusive focus on rational argumentation ased on his verificationist
son

theory of truth ignores the original reason why Christians

elieve.

IS GOD-TALK RATIONAL

elieves deductive and non-deductive arguments will determine the
He points out there is an a priori, deductive ele

Mackie

uestion

of God s e istence.

thinking, ut he gives priority to the a posteriori, non-deductive ele
pointedly, there must e clear evidence of an empirical kind to con
vince the thoughtful person today that God e ists.
Many of Mackie s epistemic considerations are surely on target. It is insuffi
cient for faith to e grounded simply on itself. Otherwise faith degenerates into
superstition. Theistic claims thus cannot e e empted from a critical e amination
ment in all

ment. More

of the evidence. In fact, the modern demand for critical reflection on the nature
of truth is the product of Christian theology itselL Christian faith would not e

true to itself if it

Mackie s too

re ected

critical

God in Jesus may e in part
a out causal reasoning. It is

contradictory,

thinking.

rief dismissal of the rational claims of

that Hume s

a

historical revelation of

already
adopted Hume s attitude
not
to
highly interesting,
say parado ical or even
of
divine
action in history is
primary re ection
ecause he

had

a miracle, and a miracle would
e a contradiction of
the causal laws of nature. Hume says such a violation of the law of causality can
not e allowed.
Yet, and here is the curious turn in his thinking, his so-called
the cosmological proof of God is ased on his denial that we
a
out
skepticism

ecause it would constitute

know whether there is any such thing as causality. The only things
know, he says, are things which are immediately sensuous i.e., what we
can

physically

see,

touch, hear, smell, and

taste.

Incidentally,

Hume s

we

can

skepticism
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causality

a out
ence

thing

is the very

ecause Hume s

matic slum er

itself.

that Kant said

theory destroyed

At any rate, Hume wanted to have it

theistic arguments,

awakened

ut then

the
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of out my dog
philosophical asis of sci
me

oth ways. He uses the law of
causahty
it in a self-serving way to
support his

against
rehgious skepticism. Interestingly enough, Mackie em races Hume s argument
to support his reasons for not elieving in the Christian revelation of God in his
tory, ut nowhere does he note this logical inconsistency in Hume s thinking.
In fact, Mackie falls victim to the same contradiction. He
argues against the
ecause
Lei
ini
s
we
version
cosmological argument
allegedly cannot know
that everything must have a sufficient reason. Yet his argument against mira
uses

cles is that it contradicts the natural law of
must have

thing
ple of causality
the theist s

a

reason

rational, causal e planation.

to disallow miracle and

of causal

ustify

which

He insists

assumes

on

that every

the rational

princi

his atheism, ut he dis ualifies
which would re uire that God is the ultimate

reasoning
dogmatically asserts that causal reasoning ustifies
atheism, and at the same time dogmatically disallows causal reasoning to e
used y theists for e plaining the origin of the world. Like Hume, it is okay
when the principle of causality serves his purposes, ut not okay when it
doesn t. He says that we might well wish the universe conformed to our intellec
tual preference for some ultimate cause,
ut we have no right to assume that
the universe will comply with our intellectual preferences.
In the same vein,
Mackie should also allow that he might wish that the universe was not open to a
divine miracle, ut he has no right to assume that the universe will comply with
his intellectual preference.
In the final analysis, whether or not a miracle has occurred such as the incar
nation of an infinite God is a historical uestion, not merely a philosophical one.
urther, if Mackie as he must do allows that causal reasoning is valid and nec
essary for understanding the se uence of individual occurrences in nature and
in history, then it is even more compelling to see that the larger whole of reality
also e e plained according to causal reasoning. To say the whole of reality is an
irrational given is to undermine reason itself. or that would e to say that there
is no reason why reasoning e ists, and if there is no reason why reasoning e ists,
then reason cannot e ist
or it is the very nature of reasoning to find an e pla
nation why everything and anything e ists. Even if there were an infinite regress
in the past so that the world was eternal, causal reasoning still re uires us to ask
the larger uestion of the whole and why there is anything rather than sheer
Cause of

use

everything.

Mackie

nothing.

IS GOD-TALK MERELY EMOTIONAL

The

reasons

for faith

or

dence. The critical factor is

simply ased on the empirical
personal udgment. Why do some people elieve
unfaith

are never

evi

and
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others do not
ased

e sure,

To

a

scholarly udgment to eheve
ody of evidence,

consideration of the whole
personal and intuitive. There are

on a

largely
itive udgment.
Certainly
Emotional factors

or

not to

elieve is

udgment is
many factors which influence this intu
cultural and traditional elements are important.
ut this

fairly decisive. The attitudes which we developed
throughout
important. Damaged emotions and hurt feelings,
with
along
severely disappointing religious e pectations, contri ute to our atti
tudes of skepticism and despair. On the other hand,
many do not eheve
ecause they fail to see the practical or personal relevance of faith. Others would
like to elieve, ut think the empirical evidence is insufficient. Yet
many eheve
ecause they see its practical and personal relevance, and are convinced of its
rational empirical evidence. Even in Jesus day, some eheved in him as the Son
our

as

life

well

are

of God, ut most did not.
To illustrate further the

logic

are

most

personal

element of

having

to

udge

the evidence and

of faith, one can o serve the difference in opinion etween Mackie and Kai
Nielsen, oth of whom are self-avowed atheists. Mackie thinks the logic of

theological language is entirely intelligi le and coherent, ut Nielsen
God-language of Christian thought incoherent and confused. As
we have
pointed out, Richard Swin urne has devoted much of his scholarly
efforts to demonstrating the coherence of Christian talk a out God. Mackie
Christian

frankly

calls the

agrees with Swin urne, ut Nielsen does not. Yet
against Swin urne s view of theism.
How does

The

answer

one

is in

know whether Mackie

part

that there is

a

or

oth Mackie and Nielsen agree

Nielsen is correct

Or Swin urne

personal intuitive element in all knowing.

only are the empirical facts of our e perience characteri ed y epistemic
pro a ility, ut even our understanding of what is logical is su ect to dispute.
This is not a case for skepticism, ut a frank acknowledgement of our finite, lim
ited understanding of the nature of truth.
Mackie is certainly correct in saying that a persuasive factor is our under
What Mackie minimi es is the larger role
standing of the evidence as a whole.
which intuitive udgments play in the decision-making process. More specifical
ly, Mackie fails to show the larger role that our presuppositions e ercise in the
attitudes we develop concerning the larger ody of evidence.
Of course, Mackie is right to point out that the psychological dimension is not
an
ade uate foundation for a thoughtful person to ase their faith on. But,
Mackie fails to give the feeling dimension due consideration as part of the larger
ody of evidence. Aristotle De Anima and Rhetoric , and the long history of phi
losophy, recogni e the epistemic value of feeling and emotion. Mackie appar
ently would simply reduce religion to mere feeling and then dismiss it.
eeling is intrinsic to a rational understanding of the meaning of life. While
feeling is not always to e trusted in informing us a out the o ective truth of
our world, we certainly could not know in the fullest sense of the term without
Not
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capacity for feeling. Our capacity to know truly can go no deeper than our
capacity to feel, ut our feehngs can certainly e deeper than our capacity to
know. The larger ody of people in the history of the world have generally
relied more upon their feelings than upon their capacity to reason in deciding
the fundamental issues of life. That does not mean feelings are inherently anti
thetical to reason, ut our capacity for feeling is more spontaneous and provides
us with a more immediate perception of things, whereas our
capacity to reason
is more deli erate and provides us with a mediated interpretation of reality.
The fact that rehgion is so deeply part and parcel of the human situation, as is
evidenced y what most people in the history of the world have felt, cannot e
easily discarded as irrational. To conclude that God does not e ist ecause feel
ing is an integral part of religious elief is un ustifia le. While the tendency of
modern theology has often een to put faith on the side of feeling as
Schleiermacher did , Mackie puts atheism on the side of reason and re ects the
cognitive significance of feeling. Yet reason devoid of feeling is no longer true
or reason cannot dispense with the asic feeling of trust, meaningfulreason.
ness, purpose, and unity and still do the task of developing a well-reasoned per
spective on life.
Interestingly enough, the successor of A. J. Ayer as professor of logic at the
University of O ford is Michael Dummett, a devout Roman Catholic Christian.
In contrast to Ayer who was the leading logical empiricist in Britain, his view is

our

that if he did not

elieve in God, there would

e little motivation for him to

study philosophy and logic. He ecame a Christian ecause he thought it was
the reasona le thing to do. He says, T think it s only to do with the eitgeist that
religious elief is intellectually e tremely unfashiona le.
In regard to the impasse of the role of logic in deciding the uestion of God s
e istence, Hein W. Cassirer s reason for ecoming a Christian are revealing. His
father

the eminent Kantian scholar, Ernst Cassirer. Hein Cassirer went to
934 and taught at Glasgow University. At the age of thirty, even
efore going to Britain, he was recogni ed as an authority on Aristotle. When he
was

Britain in

ecame

Glasgow University in 94 , he ecame
philosophy. At the age of 50, he says he
right
authority
had no knowledge whatever of religious pro lems nor any interest in them. My
sole preoccupation was with philosophical uestions.
or some ine plica le
the Apostle Paul. He
to
read
when
old
Cassirer
he
was
reason,
egan
fifty years
was
and
moral
with
Paul
s
understanding of the
insights
immediately impressed
in his

a

permanent faculty mem er

own

relationship

an

on

at

Kant s

etween law and grace. Cassirer also admits that he had grown dis
pretensions of reason which he thinks typically characteri e

satisfied with the
the writings of

philosophers.

philosophy is supposed on all sides to e a purely rational activity,
relying upon the intellect and the intellect alone, without ever allowing
While
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itself to

e

swayed y any personal or emotional ias, there remains this
fact: Utterly different conclusions are reached y various
thinkers, each philosopher arguing with great vehemence and ingenuity in
favor of the position he wishes to
uphold, while yet the possi ility is whol
ly e cluded that agreement might e reached etween him and his oppo
nents. This, of course, raises the crucial
pro lem whether any such thing as
a reha le criterion of truth is availa le within the
compass of philosophical
thinking at all. So far as I could see, no satisfactory solution had ever een

distur ing

offered.

In the

light

of the

whether the intellect
damental

pro lems

impasse which reason was locked into, he wondered
really a suita le instrument for dealing with the fun

was

of e istence.

At the age of 5 , Cassirer

the He rew

prophets,

was

apti ed

and wrote

a

treatise

on

Paul, Kant and

which he called Grace and Law. At the conclusion of his

ook, he e plains his reasons for coming to accept the Christian faith. It was
ecause of the moral, life-changing message of the grace of God of which Paul
was a
powerful witness. As for myself, I may e plain here that, if I have come
to em race the Christian

religion,

this has

een almost

wholly due

to the

impres

sion made upon me not only y St. Paul s teaching ut y his personality as it
reveals itself in his epistles.
He goes on to say there is only one way a human
can
ecome
his
or her true self, and that is
eing
y making a complete surren

der to Christ. 3
Is it

really possi le

to

Cassirer writes:

conclusively

prove that the Christian faith is true

fully aware that nothing that has een said may serve to
esta lish either that Jesus Christ is the Son of God or that he appeared to St.
Paul on the road to Damascus. Yet, as I have remarked efore, I myself
have no dou t that St. Paul is right on oth counts. This is largely ecause
I am, of course,

impression I have formed of St. Paul is that he was the very last man to
self-deception and ecause, in conse uence, I find it impossi
le to entertain seriously the idea that his spiritual pilgrimage had a hallu
cinatory e perience for its starting point.
the

fall victim to

I

suspect that

Hein

Cassirer s

testimony

would smack of sheer

su ectivity

for Mackie. But at least Cassirer gave the i lical documents a serious study and
the overall ody of evidence persuaded him that faith in Christ is reasona ly

professes atheism and the asis of
willing to admit. Our choices a out
the meaning of life, or its lack of meaning, are never purely rationalistic and
intellectualistic, as Cassirer accurately points out.
The foundational issues of life are not decided y reasoning deductively or
ased in

o ective

truth. The

his decision involves

more

point is,

Mackie

factors than he is
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non-deductively, as important as oth types of reasoning are. The decision of
truth is finally arrived at through dialectic dialogical thinking. Out of the con
versations of oth private and pu lic life, of oth practical and academic life, do
the attitudes we develop a out trust, unity, meaning and purpose take shape.
The decisive issue is not simply having a grasp of the larger ody of evidence,
ut the attitudes which we ring to that larger ody of evidence. Mackie fails to
consider this larger epistemic dimension of reason which includes values, feel
ings, emotions and attitudes.
Mackie presumes too much when he thinks he proves that God does not e ist.
Hence he calls it a miracle that any should elieve. T. H. Hu ley, the father of
modern

agnosticism, very much disliked theologians who thought they could
prove God s e istence, ut even more distasteful to Hu ley were the philoso
phers who were atheists: Of all the senseless a le I have ever had occasion to
read, the demonstrations of these philosophers who undertake

to tell

us

all

a out the nature of God would

e the worst, if they were not surpassed y the
still greater a surdities of the philosophers who try to prove that there is no
God.

Though Hume did not try to prove atheism, he did reduce knowledge to feel
ing or sentiment. The guide to life, he says, is custom esta lished y our natural
instincts and feelings, not reason. Rational reflection would immo ili e us com
pletely in the clutches of skepticism were not nature too strong for us, Hume
o serves. Hume inconsistently uses reason to show that reason is not our guide
in life

Bertrand Russell, a religious agnostic, says that Hume s skepticism was
ecause having undermined reason he then appealed to reason for

insincere,

interpretation of the world. Hume was prepared to say that
really
anything not even the real physical world eyond our
senses. It is difficult to
argue with a skeptic ecause they make no real claims to
The
knowledge.
only way that Mackie can e consistent on this point is to e a

developing his
we

own

do not

skeptic,

know

ut instead he is

an

avowed atheist.

Mackie does not follow Hume s

reasoning

to this final conclusion. Nowhere

does Mackie propose that our guide to life is a custom which is grounded in pas
sion and feeling as opposed to reason. Nor does he suggest that he em races a

knowledge. or Hume, reason e poses the
understanding of life which would propel
am iguities
us into the
of
a yss
Pyrrhonianism if our natural instincts and feehngs did not
override our rational reflection. But Mackie assumes that reason is our guide to
life which frees us from skepticism and ena les us to re ect a religious perspec
tive on life altogether.
I suspect that Hume, despite Mackie s attempt to e a modern restatement of
Hume s epistemic sensationahsm, would not take too kindly to this misappro
priation of his thought. I say this ecause on one occasion when Hume was din-

skeptical

attitude a out

uncertainties and

our

claims to

of

our
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ing

with the philosophes of Paris, he
caustically remarked that he didr t elieve in
the e istence of atheists. Baron d Hol ach
replied to Hume that he had een
most unfortunate and that now he was surrounded
seventeen atheists. The

point

of Hume s comment

than what is

possi le

y

that any alleged atheist is claiming to know more
for the human mind to reasona ly conclude. Both the athe
was

ism of his Paris friends and their commitment to

the universe

were more

Apparently

Mackie thinks he has

cal sensationalism

the whole

than Hume

ody

developed

e planation of
rationally proved.
logic of Hume s philosophi

a

elieved could
the

mechanistic

e

consistently than his mentor, ut it is far from clear that
of evidence which Mackie em races for himself proves his athe
more

right when he accuses Hume of eing insin
ility to demonstrate the truth of anything, ut
Mackie is virtually uncritical and deadly serious a out reason s a ility to prove
his atheistic perspective. There is hardly a tinge of even a mild form of skepti
cism in Mackie s philosophical point of view It is apparent that theists aren t the
only ones who sometimes surrender to dogmatism
Mackie also riefly alludes to three other sources for e plaining the nature of
euer ach, Mar and reud. These three sources are perhaps more
religion
widely used as a asis for em racing the atheistic position than Hume, perhaps
ecause they are more clearly atheistic in their thinking than was Hume, as well
as the fact that their
writings are more widely known. euer ach s idea of God
human
ideals was a significant landmark in the history of athe
as a
of
pro ection
ism ecause he was the first to offer a genuinely philosophical ustification for
modern atheism. To e sure, modern atheism originated in the development of
modern natural science and its mechanistic interpretation of the world provided
y the eighteenth century rench materialists. Mar s socio-economic interpre
tation of religion has also een widely influential. But reud s psychological
analysis of religion as compensation for repressed comple es and unconscious
wishes has given atheism a road asis of acceptance, even though euer ach s
analysis is generally recogni ed to e more philosophically persuasive. Each of
these interpretations has een riefly incorporated into Mackie s thought with
little critical e amination, and he limits the possi le sources of religion to these
social, economic and psychological factors as they have een o served in the socalled natural history of religion, as Hume termed it in his writings, as opposed
to a supernatural history of revelation.
istic conclusion. Russell may e
cere in his attack on reason s a

IS GOD-TALK NEUROTIC
Mackie thinks it strange that so many rehgious people draw from psychology
insights into human emotion as support for theism. It surely seems fair

and its

uncomforta le with the role which emotion and feeling
perception of truth. This is illustrated in his assessment of

to say that Mackie is

play

in

our

Niet sche s

style

of atheism. He thinks that Niet sche s

terminology,

God is

The Miracle

dead
human

silly concept. Mackie apparently
feeling concerning the reality of God. Niet
is

God dead

a

Where has God

gone

atheism em races. Mackie s rather
tion of God s e istence
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fails to reali e the

of

sche s dramatic

Is

depth
uestion,

reflects the emotional loss which modern

emotionally

portrays that, for him,

casual and nonchalant e amina

not much of a positive value is
really at stake if God doesn t e ist.
Though he is uite sure that psychological factors are the ultimate source of
religions, the ta les can e turned and it could e argued that atheistic theories
are faith-systems as well and are also
merely a psychological compensation for
reducing neurotic stress. At least Karl Jung so interpreted reud s atheism and
his concept of the Oedipus Comple as a rationali ation for reud s own neurot
ic fears. Certainly Mackie s need to refute theism and defend atheism could e
open to such a psychological analysis, even as he has accused religious people of
the need to mask their own fears. Harvard psychologist, Gordon Allport, cau
tioned that those who find the religious principle of life illusory would do well
not to scrutini e their own working principles too closely.
It certainly seems
e tremely strange, that if religion is merely ased on fantasy and is so irrational,
that it would generate such a lifelong o session and re uire such a serious,
scholarly refutation as Mackie provides. Gordon Allport has shown that religion
can
e an important aspect of developing a mature personality. He writes: A
man s religion is the audacious id he makes to ind himself to creation and to
the Creator. It is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own person
ality y finding the supreme conte t in which he rightly elongs. In this
respect, it can e argued that Mackie s atheism is his own personal religious
attempt to provide a sense of meaning and purpose to his own life. It is
inevita le that one will attempt to locate his her own individuality within the
larger conte t of reality. Whether or not one can e perience a sense of peace and
security with the denial of any larger meaningful conte t is e actly the uestion
which every ody must decide for oneself. Mackie may e perfectly content with
out a larger meaningful conte t, ut this lack of unity and meaning is the essence
of nihilism. Mackie simply asserts that goodness and value are inherently
human. He has no further need to ask why this is so. He also refuses to feel the
nihilistic implications of his atheism.
What is also a glaring omission in Mackie s use of Hume s philosophy, as
noted a ove, is that he completely ignores Hume s claim to e a skeptic. There is
not a
large difference etween Hume s skepticism and Niet sche s nihilism
e cept that the latter e presses a depth of feeling a out the loss of certainty and
meaning of the world which is suppressed in skepticism. Hume writes of his own
philosophy: By all that has een said the reader will easily perceive that the phi
losophy contained in this ook is very skeptical and tends to give us a notion of
the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reason
ing is there reduced to e perience, and the elief which attends e perience is
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e plained to e nothing ut a peculiar sentiment or lively conception produced
y ha it. Mackie s appropriation of Hume s philosophy stops short of em rac
ing his skepticism, ut he has simply e changed it for a narrow dogmatism.
Mackie denies he is a nihilist, ut without a
larger conte t of meaning to
which he can relate his life, it would
seem that he is a nihilist whether
certainly
he recogni es it or not. Toward the end of his life, Niet sche wrote: That I have
een asically a nihilist is something that I have only recently come to admit.
Niet sche s slow admission of his nihilism leads him to say that it seems impos
si le that aimlessness in itself should
seems

of

to admit here that

consistency. Being
feeling

nihilism without

our

faith.

Niet sche

the contradiction. Yet, if atheism is the final word that
larger reason for the meaning of the universe can e

God is a sent and that

no

had

effective

there

asis of

e the

pure nihilism is really impossi le from the standpoint
the logician that Mackie is, he certainly could not em race
a

e

philosophical

defense

against nihilism Hans
Kung,
recogni ing
necessarily nihilists, made this
in
his
Does
God
E
ist
and
Mackie
was
ook.
point
particularly annoyed y it.
Niet sche s atheism at least catches the depth of human feeling and thinking
can

no

while

that all atheists

are

not

in contrast to Mackie s too comforta le refutation of

elief in God. This is not to

say that Mackie should not e taken seriously. Indeed, his considerations are
worthy and respecta le. But his conclusions are too hasty and too sweeping to

religious e perience.
why Mackie s atheism is not convincing is that he
shows little awareness of the e istential feeling which Tillich calls the a ysmal
depth of reality. The feeling that we are strung out over the a yss is not neces
sarily a pathological, psychological state of mind. It defines our ontological situ
e considered

Among

a

final

other

ation. Neurotic fears

the real
tic

source

ideologies

of

low to

reasons

our

are

meaningless

and

our

attention from

and doctrines, even if they are atheis
e rationali ations to hide our neurotic insecuri

Ideologies

and doctrines, can
e relieved

ties. These an ieties may

of

irrational diversions which distract

an ieties.

nothingness

through therapy, ut the e istential an iety
e cured though it may e covered up

cannot

and denied in neurotic rationali ations.

developing the nihilism of Niet sche, the continental e istentialists
certainly insightful in pinpointing the conse uence of a world without God.
Can atheism e taken seriously without the depth of feeling which nihilism
entails Any atheism which denies the implications of nihilism as its conse
uence is emotionally shallow. or it fails to come to terms with the an iety of
meaninglessness. If the history of religions proves anything, it proves that the
feeling of aloneness and emptiness is a universal feeling which pushes one to try
to come to terms with the ultimate meaning and purpose of the universe. This
emotional need for a satisfying relationship with the larger meaning of the uni
verse is essentially a rehgious need. To acknowledge this
psychological need is
not to e plain away rehgious e perience. It is to recogni e, as did
Augustine,
In further

are
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that

we were

peace and
There

intended to have

a

rest in the world until

can

e

no

relationship
we
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with God and that

we

find peace and rest in God.
and human

emotionally fulfilling relationships

of the term in

apart from this religious
this religious perception which universally stamps the pages of

the truest
is

sense

our

world
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cannot find

happiness

in

dimension. It
human histo

ry. It does not seem reasona le to conclude that this universal cry of the human
heart for the warmth of divine love and protection can e e plained away as

merely infantile and
a

denial of

our

and truth. To

mere

wishful

thinking. Such a conclusion resem les more of
a
genuine openness to our need for reality

e istential needs than

e sure, this e istential need in itself does not prove the e istence
e used to ustify any particular religious elief.
can it

personal
a rationally significant factor
dimension in reality.

of

God. Nor

a

But it is

Creatures

C. S. Lewis writes:

are

for

not

recogni ing

the

validity

of the

religious

orn with desires unless satisfaction for

cold, there is warmth which we seek. If we are
to
is
water
there
satisfy our thirst. If we are tired, there is rest for our
thirsty,
odies. If we desire fellowship and unity eyond what this world can offer, the
those desires e ists.

If

we are

pro a le e planation is that I was made for another world. If none of my
earthly pleasures satisfy iL that does not prove that the universe is a fraud.
Pro a ly earthly pleasures were never meant to satisfy iL ut only to arouse iL
to suggest the real thing.
Mackie gives considera le attention to William James s arieties of Religious
E perience. James elieves his studies of first-hand reports, oth pu hshed and
unpu lished, show that the origin of rehgious e perience is more than self-sug
gestion. Mackie re ects this conclusion. Instead he offers a psychological e plana
tion which draws upon Hume s idea that fear is the origin of rehgion.
It may well e that fear is a motivation for people ecoming religious. But
what is fear Since the rise of psychoanalysis, we have een made aware of the

most

more

precise

distinction

etween fear and

an iety dread .

ear is

an

emotional

is an emotional response
response to a specific danger, whereas an iety dread
to a more diffused and uncertain danger. The classic treatise on an iety is found

and
Kierkegaard s writings, ut Tilhch s The Courage to Be provides a helpful
e
istential
etween
he
which
in
an iety and
distinguished
insightful discussion
finite e is
our
of
condition
universal
the
is
neurotic an iety. E istential an iety
and
finally death.
tence as we feel threatened
y guilt, meaninglessness
and the var
fear
etween
distinction
this
Unfortunately, Mackie does not pursue
in

ious kinds of an ieties.

in reaction
Presuma ly Hume thought fear was a universal emotion
a
mind
in
need for safety and security. He apparently had
pathological defini
human
tion of fear which is inhi iting and destructive of
personality. Hume s
life was apparently free of these neurotic tendencies according to his own
account. He descri ed himself as a man of mild disposition and an open.
to

our

Wood
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social, cheerful humor.

Did Hume feel

a sense

of e istential

an iety

as

he

con

larger meaning of life in general Apparently not. Shortly efore his
death, he composed a funeral oration of himself. The ruling passion of his
life was literary fame, though he says his disappointment of not
achieving it
sidered the

never soured my temper.
It is apparent that Mackie likewise did not feel the e istential an ieties associ

ated with

finitude.

Certainly that he re ected nihilism would seem to indicate
feelings. In fact, many intellectual people dis
claim any awareness of e istential an iety and feelings of estrangement. Many
well-educated people simply en oy a comforta le kind of pragmatism without
the slightest hint of eing plagued with the kind of e istential an iety and
despair which Kierkegaard, Niet sche, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Camus and
our

that he felt free of these an ious

Tillich wrote a out.

though many
despair as opposed to
Even

does not in itself

American and British
a

neurotic

despair

ness

our

finiteness, this

that it isn t there. In fact, it could e thought that the
of e istential an iety may e symptomatic of an undiag

developed
an iety. In their

e istentialists

of e istential

do not feel the e istential

mean

denial of any feeling
nosed neurotic fear. But, of course, even when
iety, they will not necessarily ecome theists.

European

people

which arises out of

atheism

people

admit their e istential

uite the

directly

case, atheism

contrary,

in response to their

was

intentionally developed

follow the

tion of fear

If

invalidated

ecause it

we

ought

we

out of

an

thinking

arose as an

attempt

to

of Mackie

attempt

to conclude that atheism can also

aware

consciously developed

response to the emotion of fear dread .
Are we to conclude, then, that e istentialist atheism is discredited
was

come

so

in

ecause it

to terms with the

emo

who concluded that theism is

to resolve the emotion of fear

e

an

the continental

then

discredited

theory y incorporating reud s interpretation of reh
Religion e presses and seems to fulfill very strong and

Mackie refines Hume s
Mackie writes:

gion.
persistent wishes, oth conscious and unconscious, and that the eliever s sup
posed relation to God or the gods is significantly like that of a child to its par
ents, and is pro a ly influenced y the adult s memory of that relation, will
Mackie s uncritical acceptance of reud s view of religion
hardly e disputed.
as a universal o sessional neurosis is surprising, to say the least.
or, despite the
reud in the modern world and the significant amount of
enormous influence of
pioneering work which he did in psychology, his views, and especially his reli
gious views, have not een followed uncritically even y his own students.
Karl Jung was reud s most distinguished student, and reud had wanted
him to e his successor.
They en oyed a close friendship for a time until reud
a ruptly roke with Jung over the issue of religion. Jung frankly says that
reud himself had a neurosis, no dou t diagnosea le and one with highly trou
He in particular eheved that at the core of reud s neurolesome symptoms.
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sis

was

his denial of the

religious aspects of his own personal e
iographer of Karl Jung reports that

dence of his neurosis, one
son himself Jung . This

Jung

to

accept his

reud

with

over

the

Among

As evi

reud wanted

a

in the way that reud had a strong need for
reud fainted twice when Jung e pressed disagreement

death wish.

reud.

o vious to

istence.
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was seen

views.

etween his

tionship

of Atheism

theory

the hundreds of

of the

patients

This iographer also o serves that the rela
Oedipus Comple and his own life was not
that

sought

Jung, he o served that a key
religious e perience. He
also o served that their recovery was directly related to their a ility to once
again e perience the meaning of their lost religious faith.
Paul it , a psychologist from New York University, recently has argued that
atheism is an unconscious Oedipal wish-fulfillment.... that comes from the very
reudian theory.
center of
Unlike reud s interpretation of the Oedipus
Comple , it suggested that atheism can e the result of those who re ect God
factor in their

as

their

ather

an iety

disorders

was a

out

loss of faith and

ecause of their desire to kill their

reud s dislike of his

own

fathers. In fact,

it

shows

earthly father was highly influential in the devel
opment of reud s atheism. Not religion, ut atheism is an o sessional neuro
sis
reud s attack on religion was thus a pro ection of his own neurosis.
One widely known and respected Neo- reudian was Karen Horney. While
retaining what she considered the fundamentals of reud s teachings, she dis
agreed with reud s view that neurosis can e e plained as a compulsive,
instinctive drive aimed at satisfaction. Rather, distur ed human relationships are
the cause of an iety disorders.
Horney descri es one of the symptoms of dis
tur ed human relationships as the need to move away from people. This is the
need to e e cessively self-sufficient, detached, and totally ade uate in oneself.
One of its primary symptoms is the ina ility to involve oneself in commitment
that

own

and trust.

A British

psychoanalyst,

rank Lake, has also written

e tensively

on

this an i

ety disorder. He calls it the schi oid position. The schi oid position is distrust
ful of feeling and emotion in general. It suppresses all feelings hate, love, oy,
sadness. Scorn also characteri es schi oid ehavior. Lake notes that reud was
una le to

e istential

on

outside the self

recogni e
personal sources

an iety
as

ecause

the

regard dependence
truly human eing.

he did not

prere uisite

of the schi oid

of

a

type.
away from others reflected in the schi oid
opposite of the need
position in what Horney calls the need of moving toward people. This is typ
ical of the hysterical compliant person who clings to others ecause of a com
Lake elieves

reud s

The

pulsory

own

neurosis
to

need to

was

move

e hked and receive affection in

These two attitudes reflect the

an

indiscriminate fashion.

of those who suffer from neurotic

asic positions
schi
oid
self-sufficient
private person distrusts feeling ecause
an iety.
In contrast to
in
one
a
upon others.
relationship
feelings put
dependent
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Oriental

philosophy, which pri es detachment as a means of spiritual achieve
ment, neurotic detachment is not a choice, ut is an inner compulsion.
Horney
further points out that the most
striking need for the neurotic detached person is
for self-sufficiency and its most positive
is resourcefulness.
Blaise Pascal

to defend

recogni ed this
themselves against

e pression

resourcefulness of

some
philosophers who seek
the commitment of faith. Their intellectuahst
their minds from the inner truth a out themselves. The philoso

defenses protect
phers, he says, have turned away from the lust of sensory pleasure and the lust
of power for the lust of knowledge they are una le to have faith in what hes
eyond them and so they su stitute faith in their own reason. Pascal says the

philosopher encourages us to find rest in ourselves. But Pascal says this cannot
produce inner rest. It only comes from a commitment to God who is the source
of reason and truth.
In light of Pascal s emphasis on the warmth of divine fel
lowship, it is not surprising that Mackie is so predisposed against him.
Kierkegaard also knew the inade uacy of finite reason and our ina ility to
meaning from within ourselves apart from commitment to a per
own
writings grew out of the la oratory of his life. He knew
from e perience the commitment an iety of the schi oid position. As Lake
o serves, apart from Kierkegaard s commitment to the God revealed in Jesus
Christ who sustained him, he could not have een so open and so forthright in
the insights of mental suffering. Lake writes: A primary characteristic of afflic
tion and despair is its attempt to remain hidden. Precisely those who suffer most
e perience

true

sonal God. His

from it most wish to hide it.. ..even from oneself.

Why are people afflicted with the schi oid position According to psychoana
lytic theory, it is the result of a catastrophic splitting of the person in the earliest
weeks and months of one s life. It is usually associated with the loss of a signifi
cant person s face as mother. It egins where the union with mother is lost. The
ecause they have no early
schi oid is one who can t trust in the out there
memory of a secure world centered in a source person who came to answer
them in their time of need. They also tend to e contemptuous of those who do
elieve in the out there.

Psychoanalytic

studies show that this neurotic dread is driven

underground

feeling of
hysterical-emo

ecause it is intolera le to the conscious mind. Dread is the insecure

isolated world where you are the
living
tional person, this fear causes the person to
in

an

only o ect.
cling to others

In the

in the

retreating-

intellectual person, this fear causes people to detach themselves from dependen
cy on others and they develop a sense of self-sufficiency and are uite resource

ful in

constructing

a

meaningful world

all of their

own.

or many years medical science assumed that the nervous system of a a y
irth and of the earliest months of life to
was too undeveloped for memories of
e recorded in the

drug therapy

rain. But since the

has shown

ust

how

950s, the psychiatric

vividly the

use

earliest events of life

of a reactive

are

imprinted
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on

the mind. Patients

hterally

were
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a le to relive the trauma of

of suffocation

irth and the

damaging e perience
they
pushed through the irth
canal. Other patients have een a le to relive, through a reactive drug therapy,
the earliest hours immediately following their irth, and memories of a andon
ment, isolation, and human coldness often have een the e perience of those
infants who later ecame afflicted with commitment-an iety.
as

were

Lake, who has done e tensive clinical work with schi oid persons,

that the

unloving

elieves

faces and stern voices at the time of

irth
of man s distortion of the truth a out the ultimate personal
God Himself. With rare insight. Lake shows that this is where the lie is

are the

reality,

itter memories of

eginnings

first told a out God, the lie which
darity with the race in ignorance,

edevils humanity, which determines our soli
pride, fear, an iety, despair, idolatry and lust,

un elief and murderous hatred of God Himself.
If

relationships

home have

een developed in an appropriate fashion, the
development of one s own ideas and eliefs has een laid. But
when this foundation has een cracked y poor relationships, the child learns to
relate to the outside world either y clinging to others or y detaching oneself
from others. Undou tedly many people have a clinging and panic-driven rela
tionship to God. They often speak of their relationship to God in highly emotion
al and affective terms. They may even give the appearance of eing super-spiri
tual, which is usually compensation for feelings of insecurity.
Detaching oneself from others is a commitment-an iety disorder which also
may have religious implications it is the attempt to protect ourselves from eing
hurt y creating distance from others. The affliction of dread is seen particularly
in intellectual people who are especially resourceful in creating a world of conceptuality which promises protection from e perience and re uires no o liga
tions to others. The special difficulty of someone suffering from an iety-com
mitment is the failure to feel the presence and love of God as a caring heavenly
ather. This person finds it difficult to feel ecause he or she is locked into a
world of protective reason.
This is the neurotic position most typical of intellectual people, as Lake has
shown. The hysterical clinging person desires a person-centered universe which
will guarantee security and safety. But the schi oid position has no need for such
a
personal universe. As Lake puts iL The craving is for an order ased on any
thing ut dependence on others. Since all that has een offered y availa le per
sons amounts, not to an ordered world,
ut to chaos, the ego takes refuge in a
order ased on its own cogitations.
Lake identifies the e istentialist theolo
gians, Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich, as representative of the schi oid posi
at

foundation for the

tion ecause of their attitude of distrust toward the historical foundation of
Christian faith and their impersonal view of God. Lake shows that St. Paul s

warnings against

inflated intellectuahsm and

ter to the Corinthians and the Colossian

gnostic speculation,

letters,

are

in the first let

directed at the kinds of
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Wood

defenses
The

typical of the

gnostic s

schi oid

position.

Lake writes:

ordinary Christians and indeed of the Bi lical record
superior person. He assumes he knows etter than the
record of the witnesses ecause he always feels his own
independent men
tal aristocracy as an endowment which must take precedence over mere
evidence in the o ective world. Gnostics show disdain, and not a little it
terness, towards them. This reveals something of the secret scorn of them
selves in which they were driven. It conceals and denies their deep envy of
warm human ties,
against the acceptance of which their life is in recoil.
view of

itself is that of the

e ample of scorn and distrust is reflected in a de ate on theism atheism
place on the campus of the University of Mississippi in 9 in
which two of the several participants were J. P. Moreland and Antony lew.
lew is an analytical philosopher whose sympathies are with the logical empiri
cist and their verification theory of truth. J. P. Moreland is a Christian theist who
One

which took

ases his faith

on

the historical revelation of God in Jesus of Na areth

as

record

ed in the New Testament. Moreland, having already argued a careful and rea
soned defense of theism, gave personal testimony to his faith in Christ in a warm

loving manner. lew s response was: Moreland s appeal to his personal
e periences strikes me as a solutely grotes ue. This ina ility to respect the
witness of someone else, along with the scornful e pression of a superior atti
tude, ear all the marks of the schi oid position which psychoanalysts descri e.
It is one thing not to e persuaded y someone s testimony, ut it is uite anoth
er matter to
rush aside someone s personal e perience with an air of arrogance
and condescension. The suppression of warm feelings is typical of the schi oid
position.
Her ert Butterfield, the internationally respected Cam ridge historian,
descri es the e cessive skepticism of some scholars toward i lical history as
reflecting a kind of intellectual arrogance which in any field of research
One cannot generali e and say that anyone who
reduces clarity of the mind.
re ects the witness of the apostles concerning their faith in Jesus Christ is
and

ut the e cessive and

schi oid,

history may

iased attitude of

e accounted for in such

This o servation may not

some

scholars toward

i lical

a manner.

e taken well

Hume and atheists like Mackie who first

y

usually skeptics like
e planation.
e rationally
most holy religion.... is founded on
he insists, along with Hume and

some,

ut it is

ring

up this neurotic
Mackie thus concludes that the central doctrines of theism cannot

defended.

He agrees with Hume that

our

And
irrational fear faith, not on reason.
reud, that this irrational faith is the product of fear and

an

irrational wish-ful

fillment.
Now I

going

am

not

saying

that all atheists

to use the Humean and

are neurotics.
My point is that if one is
reudian argument that faith is the
product of
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neurosis, then the argument also can e made against atheism. I agree with Kai
Nielsen, who says he knows oth atheists and Christians who are neurotics, and
he knows

the final

oth atheists and Christians who

analysis,
psychoanalytic interpretations.
the truth of theism

other than

or

are

perfectly

atheism must

normal and sane.
e decided

on

In

grounds

IS GOD-TALK ETHICAL

surprisingly negative attitude toward lesus of Na areth is remark
iased. He particularly takes e ception to the widely sup
a ly
notion
that
Christian
He inter
morality is particularly admira le.
posed
the
Old
Testament
without
as
ar
aric
and
morality
prets
ualifications
savage.
He accuses Jesus of engaging in harsh and unloving ehavior in contradiction to
his own preaching on love.
He portrays lesus own ethic as eing irrational
to
and opposed
knowledge.
He re ects Jesus ethic to love our neigh or as ourselves ecause this is only a
fantasy. The neurotic connotation of this term, widely used in psychoanalyt
ic writings, can hardly e overlooked. Of course there are neurotic religious fan
tasies associated with perfectionistic symptoms among some Christian people.
But what Mackie fails to understand is the transforming grace of God which
Jesus reveals. Of course we can t love the way Jesus taught us to do so without
his help. It s impossi le. But through a relationship with Jesus, whose will is one
with God, we can come to love like Jesus loved and taught us to love. And this is
no
fantasy, ut the healthy-minded lifestyle of a mature person reflected in
Corinthians 3, as the psychoanalysL Karen Horney, also o served.
Patrick Sherry wrote a philosophical treatise on elief in God. His ook was
called. Spirit, Saints, and Immortality. His main point is that the decisive o ective
proof for God s e istence revealed through Jesus of Na areth is the lives of the
saints, that is, anyone who is a genuine follower of Jesus Christ and has een
transformed y his Spirit. What he argues is that if there is a God like Jesus pro
claimed, the rationally convincing element is the witness of persons transformed
y faith in Christ. Unfortunately, Mackie s focus is almost e clusively upon the
evidence of miracles as a asis for confirming or disconfirming faith in God
rather than on the personal character and moral integrity of the lives of Christian
people.
It is certainly true that many ehevers have not e emplified the moral ideal of
love, as Mackie so rightly accuses. But for those elievers who consistently
practice the presence of God through daily devotional ha its and corporate acts
of pu hc worship, the grace-filled life of Jesus Christ will daily transform them
into his own moral image.
Mackie is right to this e tent if there is no transforming power in the teach
ing and life of Jesus with whom elievers claim to have a personal relationship,
then the God of Jesus does not e ist. That s the ottom line. Unfortunately
Mackie s

uninformed and

Wood
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Mackie s
visions is

rief survey of some who claim to know God
through miracles and
on the
kind
of
evidence.
Even
wrong
Jesus discredited those

focusing

who would

elieve

The final

simply

ecause of

alleged

miracles and

signs Matt. 2:39 .
Spirit love, oy, peace,

proof
genuine
patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control Gal. 5:2223 . Jesus said others will know who are his disciples y their fruit John 3:35 .
of

Nowhere in the Bi le

faith is the fruit of the

are we

led to think that faith trust in God arises from

a stract, scholarly, academic, and ironclad proof of

a miracle. Nowhere in the
New Testament documents is their any sensational display of miracles like a
magician would perform on stage. Bi lical miracles are intended to ring
an

redemption to the world, not to entertain. C. S. Lewis rightly limits the function
of physical miracles to e tremely restricted situations which serve the larger
cause of the
missionary situation of the Church. Not physical miracles, ut the
holiness of elievers is the final proof of God s e istence. And holiness means
essentially loving God with all your heart and your neigh or as yourself.
Without this transforming power of the grace of God mediated through Jesus,
claims to know God would e meaningless and groundless. Holiness is primary
miracles are secondary
If Karen Horney has shown from the standpoint of psychoanalytic studies
that neurotic fear is rooted in the failure of human relationships, the Bi le
shows that the first

fellowship

negative

human emotion to surface after

fear

our

first

parents

afraid and hid themselves Gen.

they
3: 0 . The purpose of the grace of God throughout the history of salvation which
culminated in Jesus Christ was to produce within human eings the love of God
which would ring harmony and understanding among all people. This is why
the apostle John says that perfect love casts out fear. He says specifically that
roke

there is

no

each other

with God

fear in love

as

God loves

was

ecause the love of Christ indwells

us

John 4: 7- .
admira le, as enno ling,

If there is any ethic as
of literature that is compara

piece

is any availa le

were

resource

to

as

us

and

we can

love

e cellent, if there is any

le in its lofty, person-affirming ethic, if there
change the character and life of any person into a

truly fulfilled individual, if there is any ond of love which will unite a
fragmented world into a ust and holy people esides the gospel of grace offered
in Jesus Christ, it has not een o served anywhere else in the history of the
world. This is why Rudolf Bultmann, who is certainly no friend to traditional
theism or orthodo Christianity, says frankly that there can e no true human
fulfillment and personal authenticity apart from faith in Christ. Why He says
the uestion is not if this kind of authentic e istence can e discovered some
where else in point of facL he says, this type of ualitative e istence has never
een discovered apart from faith in Christ. He particularly notes that
Heidegger s philosophy of e istence is entirely dependent on the Christian faith
Even the neo-Mar ist philosopher, Ernst Bloch,
of Kierkegaard and Paul.
new,
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a le to survive with
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degree of meaning in life ecause
they
religious faith. The contri ution of
the Christian view of personhood to the modern world is widely
acknowledged
also among secular psychologist and moral development theorists. I eheve it
could e argued that atheism without the enefit of Christian faith would
relapse us into the paganism of nature religions. In this respect, modern atheism
is really a Christian heresy and cannot survive on its own.
live off the

are

orrowed credit credit

a

of

IS GOD-TALK IMMORAL

Mackie

and all

a ly
into
son

reasons

good

that it is

logically

since evil e ists.

e immoral himself. Here

incoherent to affirm that God is

Such

a

again

all-powerful
permitted evil would presum
attitudinal feeling dimension comes

God who
the

eliever, while recogni ing the dilemma, trusts that there is a rea
play.
God
allows
evil. aith acknowledges that we do not have a completely
why
The

satisfactory
of this life

reason

yet,

ut in the future of God s

will know.

kingdom eyond the o scurity
only take us so far in pointing out

logic
compati ility of divine sovereignty and evil in the world. The est of the
arguments to e plain the connection etween God and evil is the free-will
defense. It maintains that God chose to limit his sovereignty when he created
human eings in his image. The possi ility of evil is corollary to the fact of finite
freedom. This helps us to understand something of the logical pro lem. or
there is no possi ility of finite freedom and the development of personal respon
si ility without the possi ility of evil.
Yet what is distur ing from the Christian point of view is the e istential feel
ing that there is too much evil rampant in the world for a good, almighty God to
permit. This is not a logical argument as such. It is strictly an intuitive perception
that pointless and irredeema le evil locks one s a ility to elieve in God. Who
hasn t felt this sense of distaste a out God permitting the e cessive, gratuitous
evil which allows the suffering and killing of innocent infants and children.
Today I listened to the confession of a 5-year-old girl who had een raped
repeatedly y her father efore she ran away from home. Outrage Anger Why
God
If God is so good and so powerful, what is the point of permitting inno
cent children to e a used se ually
Several years ago I was a chaplain s assistant in a medical center. I was on call
with my eeper when I was summoned to the emergency room. When I arrived,
several doctors and a num er of nurses were surrounding the ody of an auto
we

or now,

can

the

mo ile accident victim. One of the doctors

physically massage his heart in
avail. I had the responsi ihty of

a

shced

him open, reached inside to
all to no
to save his life

lasL frantic attempt

informing

the

family

in the

waiting

room

of his

death. He was 29 years of age and had two small children. I soon learned that his
wife had een killed in an automo ile wreck the previous year. What could I tell
the grieving sisters, rother, father, mother and two small children What sense

Wood

would it make to tell them that God loved and cared for them None Would a
free-will theodicy comfort them Hardly Incomprehensi le suffering calls into
uestion the concept of a caring God.

Someone

financial

told me a out an answered prayer that God had provided the
for them to afford medical insurance. Why would God provide

once

means

for the medical insurance of
father

in ured

in

a car

person and yet not intervene to save the life of a
Also ironically, this same person who o tained

one

wreck

medical insurance later

Supposedly God provided
incurring astronomical
costs to him and his family. This terminally ill patient apparently never felt the
contradiction of his situation. I did. Perhaps I felt the irony of the situation
ecause I wasn t the one involved in the suffering. Perhaps the intense suffering
of the human soul creates a kind of spiritual perception which is not normally
apparent. I could have scoffed inwardly at the naivete of this patient, ut then
perhaps the oke was on me and my spiritual lindness. Who was I to pass udg
ment on the providence or lack of it of God
Wolfhart Pannen erg was asked in a forum at As ury Theological Seminary
a out his resolution of the pro lem of suffering and the Christian concept of a
caring God, especially in the light of the holocaust.
Pannen erg replied y uoting from a Jewish author who said that after
Auschwit no one can talk a out God any longer. Pannen erg then remarked:
always felt that you can say that only if you are in a position of watching a
tragedy in theater. You cannot say that, if you think of yourself in the place of
medical insurance

so

developed

terminal

he could die from

cancer.

cancer

without

those who had to go into the gas ovens, ecause those who had to walk that way
had their only hope in singing psalms. ...The power to deal with e periences like
that is not in

simply o serving

them in others,

ut if

one

The

pro lem

There is

no

of

suffering,

through them
only power that

has to go

oneself.... The moment you elieve in God you get hold of the
ena les you face e periences of terror like that.

Moltmann says, is theodicy s open uestion.
pro lem either for the theist or atheist. There is

final solution to the

uestion why evil
eschatological uestion. Pannen erg points out that this
until
the last day. He maintains this issue will e defini
will
persist
pro lem
ut only y the action of God
not
our theoretical arguments,
solved,
y
tively
Himself in the future of His Kingdom.
The uestion, as E. L. Mascall has pointed out, is not whether God created the
est of all possi le worlds. Lei ni made a strong logical case for this position in
the eighteenth century in his Theodicy. The issue simply is that this is the world
God freely chose to create. God is infinite and his ways and reasons for doing
things are not entirely comprehensi le to us. God is ultimately a mystery
ecause he is infinite wisdom and he transcends our finite, limited capacity for
knowing. Shall the clay say to the potter, why did you make me like this
no

final

or the

answer

to

it, yet

eliever it is

an

one

cannot

get rid of this nagging
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not at all

that

mean

one can

hide
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e cuse

of

mystery and duck the hard intellectual

uestions. Indeed they are to e faced
with honesty and candor. But finite reason can only take us so far in developing
a thoughtful understanding of our faith. Reason
re uires us to admit that the
incomprehensive suffering of the world does call into uestion, from an e isten
tial emotional standpoint, the e istence of God.
In Dostoevsky s The Brothers Karama ov, Ivan challenges his
Tell me,

rother

Alyosha:

earnestly, challenge you
Imagine
creating a fa ric of human destiny with the o ect of making men
happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, ut that it was essen
tial and inevita le to torture to death only one tiny creature
a
would
consent
to
e
the
architect
on
those
conditions
Tell
me,
you
a y....
and tell the truth.
No, I wouldn t consent, said Alyosha softly.
said Ivan

I

that you

answer.

are

In the final

against

analysis,

faith in God

the

e cept

pro lem
for

one

of evil poses insurmounta le evidence
history which disarms the attack of

fact of

emotional and rational arguments. Taylor Caldwell has descri ed this fact
with therapeutic and theological insight in a ook. The Listener, where she
our

num er of persons who pour out their souls to a
Eventually these people come to a point of honesty in

descri es
tain.

a

grief and pro lems

and

complain itterly against

man

ehind

talking

a cur

a out their

the universe. At that

curtain opens and they see the Author of the universe, not
complacency, ut crucified upon the Cross.

point, the
standing idly y in

IS GOD-TALK HISTORICALLY DERI ED

development of historical criti
Although Christianity is said to e a his
torical religion, the historical claims especially a out the life of Christ are not
treated as historical, ecause elievers do not apply to them the sort of dou t
which would ordinarily apply to historical statements a out any fairly remote
epoch. What is also apparent is that Mackie does not know that the develop
ment of modern critical history took its rise from within Christian theology and
critical i hcal studies.
And the cutting edge in contemporary theology and
i lical studies has een an in-depth and pro ing analysis of the reha ility of
It is

cism in

apparent that Mackie did

not know of the

i lical studies when he wrote:

the historical events in the Bi le.

development of the critical historical method, the histori
cal elements of the Bi le have een su ected to the most sever and painstaking
analysis of any document ever I am reminded of a statement y C. S. Lewis who
reported that, during his struggles to defend his atheism, it came as a shock when

Through

the modern

the hardest

oiled of all the atheists I

that the evidence for the

good.

historicity

Of course, C. S. Lewis

was

ever

knew sat in my

led to

a

room.... and

remarked

really surprisingly
Gospels
thoughtful analysis of the historical

of the

was

Wood

claims in the New Testament and

ecame a Christian. His classic treatment of the
miraculous foundation of Christian faith is contained in his ook. Miracles. Here
he deals with all the philosophical issues and concludes that the
issue

primary

a out the truth of Christian faith is historical, not merely philosophical.
The central New Testament declaration is that Jesus of Na areth is the histori
cal appearance and personal em odiment of God s true eing. This self-revela
tion of God

was

of this historical

y Jesus

made known

occurrence

Christian faith would not e ist.
stands in

particularity

meaning of Christian faith. Without it.
The decisive significance of this historical event
other religions. urther, the Christian attitude

sharp contrast to all
importance of historical

toward the

religions
religions.

death and resurrection. The

is the decisive

events

separates itself from all non- i lical

which are, in essence, nature religions rather than historically- ased
Bi lical scholarship has shown that there is a central core of inter-con

nected events

eginning

with A raham and

continuing down through the for
culminating in the history of Jesus. This series
of events is called the history of salvation. This history contains a progressive
unfolding, developing, and enlightening view of God which reaches its highest
point in the declaration, ased on his resurrection from the dead, that Jesus is the
mation of the nation of Israel and

Son of God.

Of
other

course

there

religions.

are

parallels and similarities etween Christianity and
early centuries of the Christian faith, oth Christians

many

rom the

and non-Christians have noted these similarities. But there

are

radical difference

well, and often the similarities are primarily superficial and shallow. The
really significant difference is the Christian attitude toward history. The
as

Christian faith cannot survive for
to
on

e false

or even

pro a ly

a

moment if its historical claims

false.

or

i lical

rational evidence and relia le witnesses see

religion places
Corinthians

a

can

e shown

high premium

5 . If the histori

apostolic claims a out Jesus of Na areth were shaky, then intel
lectual integrity and honesty would not allow us to elieve. This stands in radi
cal contrast to other religions for whom historical evidence is irrelevant. That is
why we refer to them as having a mythological asis as opposed to the historical
cal nature of the

asis of Christian faith.

What a out the historical evidence

Is it credi le

.

.

Bruce,

now

retired pro

University of Manchester, points out that the
evidence of our New Testament writings is ever so much greater than the evi
dence for many writings of classical authors, the authenticity of which no-one
dreams of uestioning. He goes on to point out that if the New Testament
were a collection of secular writings, their authenticity would
generally e
the
New
Because
all
dou
t.
Testament
as
is
a
eyond
regarded
religious docu
ment, people are naturally suspicious of its claims and demand much more cor
ro orative evidence for such a work than they would for an ordinary secular or
pagan writing. However, Bruce points out, It is a curious fact that historians
fessor of

i lical criticism at the
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een much readier to trust the New Testament records than have

theologians. Why Because of its reports a out miracles. It is perhaps
only appropriate then that the most severe test of critical analysis ought to e
applied to the i lical record. Bruce writes:

many

But

we

do not

uarrel

with those who want

Testament than for other

writings firstly,

more

evidence for the New

ecause the universal claims

which the New Testament makes upon mankind are so a solute, and the
character and works of its chief igure so unparalleled, that we want to e
as sure

of its truth

fact there is much
ancient
To

writings

of

e sure, there

scholars

concerning

as we
more

possi ly

can

and

secondly,

ecause in

point

of

evidence for the New Testament than for other

compara le

date.

are
differing assessments among contemporary i lical
the various historical elements in the Bi le. Many claims

and reports in the Bi le cannot e historically confirmed or disconfirmed. But
the main series of events which form the asis of the history of salvation are

open to critical evaluation. It is true that some New Testament scholars do not
accept many of these central events as historically relia le accounts. Most
nota le is Rudolf Bultmann. But at least Bultmann

Corinthians
which go

was

written

y

acknowledges

that

Paul around 55 A.D. and that it contains materials

ack much further. He

acknowledges that Paul really elieves that
Jesus
acknowledged that the physical res
urrection of Jesus was really elieved to have happened y the earliest Christian
followers. Bultmann s re ection of the resurrection is ased on his e istentialist
presupposition that assumes a fact-value dichotomy, as if empirical facts have
no
earing on the ultimate meaning of life.
It is easily understanda le, in the light of his espousal of the e istentialist phi
losophy of Heidegger, that he would downgrade the importance of this histori
cal miracle. And it is unmistaka ly clear that Bultmann s historical udgment
was
iased against the empirical, historical evidence in favor of his philosophy
of e istence. In this respect, Her ert Butterfield, the late professor of modern his
tory in the University of Cam ridge, noted that the historical critical method
has often overstepped the ounds of common sense as applied to i lical
studies. The e cessive skepticism as applied to the New Testament documents
y Bultmann led him to declare that the central events, though intended to e
historical reports y the earliest Christians, are really mythological ecause of
the supernaturalism in which they are enmeshed. C. S. Lewis, one of the
world s foremost scholars in mythology, comments that to him it is o vious that
Bultmann does not understand the nature of myth. If the Gospels are myth, then
they are the most unimaginative and poorest kinds of myths which he has ever
was

read.

raised from the dead. He further

Lewis writes:

Wood

70

myself, who first seriously read the New Testament when I was, imagina
tively and poetically, all agog for the Death and Re- irth patterns tof myth
ical religions and an ious to meet a corn-king, was chilled and p u led
y the almost total a sence of such ideas in the Christian documents. One
moment particularly stood out. A dying God
the only dying God who
e
historical
holds
that
read,
is,
corn, in His hand says,
might possi ly
This is my ody.

I

Lewis shows that the

with God

as

mythologically-e pressed desire to en oy fellowship
primitive religions of the world ecomes a reality

evidenced in all

history

of Jesus Christ. The decisive difference is that the God of Jesus is
the God of nature and the God of history, and not a nature-god.
in the

This historical

uality permeates

the

i lical documents. Her ert Butterfield

argues likewise for the inherently historical nature of the New Testament docu
ments. He writes: Of course there are some writings so clear in their integrity,

respects, that within their proper realm they could
carrying their own self-ratification with them and think
that the Gospels. ...must e regarded as elongs to this class.
Of course, in
spite of the way that these i lical writings authenticate themselves instanta
neously in our minds, Butterfield points out that this is not in itself a sufficient
reason for
accepting their accuracy from the standpoint of critical history. Yet,
the continuing developments in a critical interpretation of i lical history in the
modern world further confirm its general relia ility. In fact, the core events of
the history of salvation are so clearly discerni le historically that it is usually
philosophical assumptions which produce a negative conclusion rather than the
empirical evidence.
Apparently Mackie was uninformed of the intensely critical scholarship
which has pro ed the depth of this historical uestion. The fact that he can speak
of Jesus so unhistorically as eing in the same category as Osiris, Ashtaroth,
Dionysus, Baldur, ishnu and Amida reflects how uninformed he is of critical
and

so

almost

transparent

in certain

e descri ed

historical matters.

as

But this failure to understand the nature of the historical

common
among atheists. Kail Nielsen also reflects this
uality
of
the
historical uality of Christian faith when he
understanding
superficial
writes: Why the Bi le rather than the Koran Why the Bi le rather than the
canonical Buddhist te ts Why the Bi le rather than the Hindu te ts Why the
Bi le rather than the religious revelations of other people If you look at religion
anthropologically, you will see that there are thousands of religions all claiming
In facL Nielsen says plainly that he cares nothing a out the his
The truth.

of the Bi le is

of Jesus. No matter what the historical evidence is, there is apparently
nothing that would change his mind a out the deity of Jesus.
One of the most pro ing, critical, thorough and informing analysis of the evi
dence for Jesus resurrection as reported in the New Testament documents was

toricity
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made

one-time

atheist, Wolfhart Pannen erg. In his
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God and

Man, he argues with fairness and rational o ectivity for the historicity of Jesus
resurrection. In a painstaking analysis of the evidence and in dialogue with the
est of

higher

i lical criticism which has left no stone unturned in its compre
critical
hensive,
analysis of the evidence Pannen erg shows that the evidence
of Jesus resurrection from the dead is ased on good historical foundations and
e understood in

can

continuity

with the view of God

as

developed

in the histo

ry of the nation of Israel. He e amined the intelligi ility of the concept of the
urrection itself as it was understood in poste ilic Judaism.

res

Unfortunately, the most respected atheists in the English-speaking world
apparently have not critically e amined the historical claims of the New
Testament. Pannen erg noted, in his discussions with Antony lew s atheism,
that there is a lack of sophistication in his way of dealing with the i lical
lew had argued that in the case of something so unusual as a resur
reports.
rection from the dead that it re uired evidence considera ly stronger than ordi
nary events which we can e perience through normal means. Pannen erg agreed
with his premise, and insisted that a critical e amination of the evidence should
e persuasive. There are good and even superior reasons for claiming that the
Resurrection of Jesus was a historical event, and conse uently the risen Lord him
self is a living reality.
Pannen erg at the same time notes that lew has a good
point that our e perience reveals that dead men do not rise again. And so there is
natural resistance to

a

consider the evidence for Jesus resurrection.

even

Conse uently, the de ate will continue no matter what the evidence is.
It is generally assumed, especially in the European Continental discussion,
that the uestion of critical history and its relation to Christian faith was given
its classic formulation in the nineteenth

Actually,

century writings of Ernst Troeltsch.

uestion also goes
eighteenth century. In An In uiry

the modern formulation of the critical historical

ack to David Hume in Scotland in the

Concerning

Human

Understanding, Hume
impossi le for

which will forever make it
miracles.

claims he discovered

any

thoughtful

an

person to

argument
elieve in

develops and Mackie follows up on, articulates
personal e perience is our only guide in
important points.
what
is
a true happening in the world. What is normal and custom
determining
ary according to our own e periences is the foundation for making udgments
concerning past events. Second, a thoughtful person will proportion their faith
to the evidence. There are degrees of pro a ility concerning what is to e
elieved, and we must critically assess all the known facts in esta hshing what is
This

argument which

some

to

us

e

elieved.

In

applying

to

these

accept what

Hume

irsL

our own

principles,

someone

Hume

else tells

nature inclined to tell the truth and

e plains

us

that it is

a out their

our

capacity

common

and natural for

past e periences.

We

are

y

to remem er is tenacious. Of
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course, a person who is dehrious or noted for telhng falsehoods is easily discred
ited. But, generally speaking, we assume that people speak the truth, Hume
notes. What would cause us not to accept the testimony of someone Only if

e perience and o servation, that the per
testimony which would cause us to
uestion
uestions a out the character of the
their
not
e
person
sufficiently corro orated y other witnesses
testimony may
the manner of their testimony may raise uestions they may not e hi it suffi
cient confidence in what they are reporting as a genuine happening they may
give the appearance of eing too confident in what they report. More specifical
ly, if their report contains e traordinary or marvelous occurrences which are
counter to our own personal e periences, then we rightly are suspicious of their
testimony. In these cases, we re uire a more stringent proof and are inclined not
to elieve the report, since it would e contrary to customary e periences.

we were
son was

convinced, ased

on our own

mistaken. There may e contrary
their report there may e serious

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature,
Hume
definition,
By
argues, a miracle is contrary to the uniform
of
all
it would not e called a miracle. It is no
Otherwise,
e perience
people.
But what a out miracles

Hume writes.
miracle that

should

a

come

eing rought

person should die suddenly, ut it is a miracle that a dead
ack to life, if he really had died. Can such a report of a dead
ack to life

e

accepted

man
man

relia le

testimony
must consider which alternative is the
uestion,
more
pro a le. Is the testimony given y someone with such compelling integrity
that the likelihood of the testimony eing true is greater than the likelihood of the
that the
event eing false In other words, which would e the greater miracle
If the falsehood of his
witness is mistaken, or that the event really happened
testimony would e more miraculous than the event which he relates, then, and
not till then, can he pretend to command my elief or opinion.
This is the main argument against miracles and against the pro a ility that a
To

answer

this

as a

Hume says

we

historical revelation of God could have occurred. It is this

argument which

Hume

The laws of nature are ased on
says he flatters himself to have discovered.
the principle of cause and effect. This principle is uniformly esta lished according

e perience and o servation. It would e a miracle if this law were inter
suspended. At the same time, if the report of a highly credi le wit
e false so that if the witness were mistaken it would con
ness is most unlikely to
stitute a miracle, then we have reached an impasse. At est there e ists a mutual
destruction of arguments, so that one miracle cancels out the other.
Still, then,
there is no asis for elieving that a dead man can come ack to life. To e sure,
Hume did allow that one could e e pected to elieve in miracles if the falsehood
of a witness would e a greater miracle than the actual physical miracle itself ut
he offers other supportive reasons why miracles are impossi le which together
create an accumulative effect which makes it fairly certain that no witness could
e called forth to convince one of a miracle really happening.
to our

fered with and
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Mackie thinks Hume s reasoning is conclusive. There is no way then to accept
the resurrection of Jesus there is no need to consider the pro a ilities of the
event since the most that could e e pected to e derived out of a painstaking

critical

analysis

of the historical evidence would

e

an

impasse.

What Mackie failed to reckon with is that, in spite of the numerous attempts
which have een made to e plain the miracle of the resurrection away, each

attempt has een unconvincing. All critical scholarship accepts the fact that the
earliest disciples elieved that Jesus was physically raised from the dead, and no

e planation esides the one given in the New Testament has een successful in
determining why the disciples came to their conclusion.
In the nineteenth century, David Strauss pointed out that all attempts y theo
logically li eral scholars to write a life of Jesus were failures ecause their pre
sentations of Jesus were even less credi le than the miraculous e planation
given in the gospel. His own e planation that the mythical thinking of the firstcentury elievers

is the est way to account for Jesus resurrection has also een
discredited and makes the New Testament witness even more credi le. or as

Jaspers has pointed out in discussions with Rudolf Bultmann, it is histori
cally inaccurate to udge the first-century as possessing a mythical mentality any
more than the modern world.
They, too, knew that dead men did not rise
again.
Mackie fails to provide any further solution to this dilemma. It is perfectly in
order to try to e plain the resurrection in a natural way, if that is what the evi
dence re uires. To date, any e planation for the elief of the earliest disciples in
Jesus resurrection has not een forthcoming which carries any degree of crediihty other than the miraculous one provided y the witnesses of lesus. That
Karl

and the appearances of the risen Lord to the
most severe test which can e given y the
to
the
stand
disciples
up historically
critical historical method, and elievers have sufficient and highly pro a le rea

is, the tradition of the empty tom

affirming with intellectual integrity the historical foundation of their
self-revealing action of God in Jesus was not performed secretly in
a corner,
ut was done so pu licly that Paul was sure King Agrippa could have
e amined the evidence for himself Acts 2 :2 . Likewise, we today have that
same
opportunity.
We can say Yes to Hume, that ased on the empirical evidence, along with the
credi ility of the original witnesses, it would e a greater miracle that the New
Testament witnesses were wrong than that the resurrection event itself actually
sons

faith.

for

or the

happened.

CONCLUSION
have noted, Mackie pursues Hume s skepticism into a full- lown athe
ism. The cumulative effect of all the non-deductive evidence, Mackie thinks, is
in favor of an atheistic position. The conclusion here is ust the
As

we

heavily weighted

Wood
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perception that the nature of Christian theism is rationally
coherent, ethically e emplary, psychologically healthy-minded and historically
opposite.

It is my

relia le and true. Each of us, of course, must make a decision for ourselves ased
on the
larger ody of evidence. The finally convincing proof for a Christian

eliever, however,

is to e perience the life-transforming grace of God as mediat
through a personal relationship with the risen Lord lohn 5:20 . This is not a
mere
pietistic platitude, ut a frank acknowledgement that one must e perience
the reality for oneself to know for sure.
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